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tions spring to mind. To find individuals who embody the strong 
notion of national sovereignty one looks to anti-heroes: perhaps 
J.R. Ewing. 
Professor Feinberg is well aware of these arguments against his 
position. He uses similar arguments to cast doubt upon Kant's ac-
count of personal autonomy, which relies heavily on religious and 
military metaphors. The difficulty is to construct a strong virtue of 
personal independence that yields no hostages to those who would 
march down the slippery slope of paternalism. An account which 
treasures not pure individual choice, but some abstract virtue such 
as the rationality within the individual choice, leaves room for state 
intervention. If we value Kant's strong notion of rationality, we 
may interfere with the individual's choice if it fails to select the 
most rational alternative. National sovereignty values individual 
choice in its full arbitrariness, and so fits coherently with a rejection 
of paternalism, but I suspect that the analogy of national sover-
eignty, far from lending strength to the liberal case against paternal-
ism, borrows credibility from the rejection of paternalism that it 
will never be able to repay. 
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION. By Forrest McDon-
ald.t Lawrence, Kan.: Kansas University Press. 1985. Pp. 
xiii, 293. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $9.95. 
Norman L. Rosenberg 2 
"When reflecting upon government," muses Professor Forrest 
McDonald, Americans have typically followed "the almost mystical 
habit of thinking of threes." Related to classical political theory 
and traditional social thought, this "habit may [also] have stemmed 
from the concept of the Holy Trinity . . . . " Is it something more 
than a historiographical fact, then, that Novus Ordo Sec/orum is 
Professor McDonald's third book about the Constitution, our most 
sacred political document? 
In line with the bicentennial spirit, McDonald waxes more rev-
erential than in his earlier volumes. Both We The People (1958), 
I. Professor of History, University of Alabama. 
2. Professor of History, Macalester College. 
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which relentlessly trashed Charles Beard's classic Economic Inter-
pretation, and E Pluribus Unum (1965), which advanced an alterna-
tive economic interpretation, highlighted the interplay between 
hard-nosed politics and economics. Displaying the highly individ-
ual, sometimes quirky style that defines his scholarly persona, Mc-
Donald's second volume seemed out-of-place among the refined 
intellectual histories, especially that of Gordon Wood, which lov-
ingly cultivated the ideological groves of late eighteenth-century 
America.3 Invoking, once again, the metaphor of threes, McDon-
ald now concedes that his second book rated "two cheers but not 
three" because it failed to confront ideological issues, especially 
those related to "republican" thought. Subtitling this volume The 
Intellectual Origins of the Constitution, McDonald pursues that 
third, and presumably final, cheer. 
Novus Ordo Seclorum curiously recalls McDonald's first book: 
while We the People challenged as too simplistic Beard's thesis that 
two rival economic coalitions battled over the Constitution of 1787, 
this book implicitly criticizes the view that two well-defined ideo-
logical structures, "republican" and "liberal," struggled to domi-
nate the "intellectual origins" of constitution making. Drawing 
upon the vast post-1965 secondary literature and his own reading of 
diverse primary sources, McDonald emphasizes the many different, 
often confused, sometimes conflicting, strands in late eighteenth-
century political discourse. 
Much as he had done with economic structures two decades 
earlier, McDonald now gives readers a dazzling tour of various 
"systems of political theory." In addition to "republicanism"-
something to which many people came "late and willy nilly, with 
neither a historical or philosophical understanding of what they 
were embracing" -he explores subtle variations on natural rights 
theory, the "country-oppositional ideology," and English common-
law thought. Perhaps more important, he offers a highly original 
survey of "political economy," a mode of analysis that first emerged 
only in the late eighteenth century. Here, he shows special fondness 
for Alexander Hamilton's formulations and disdain for most of 
James Madison's ideas.4 
3. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). For 
recent commentaries which acknowledge Wood's book as the dominant force in the field, see 
Forum: The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A. Symposium of Views andRe-
views, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 549 (1987). Meanwhile, though, the creation of different eco-
nomic interpretations remains a thriving business. See. e.g., The Constitution as an Economic 
Document: A. Symposium Commemorating the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 
56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. I (1987). 
4. McDonald also debunks the conventional wisdom that Madison was "the father of 
the Constitution." F. McDoNALD, NOVUS 0ROO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 0RI-
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McDonald still invokes his earlier work by linking the political 
principles of the framers to various political, economic, and regional 
interests. For example, a "puritanical republicanism," which re-
volved around an almost "totalitarian" preoccupation with moni-
toring the "virtue" of individual citizens-i.e., their willingness to 
subordinate individual interests to the general public good-per-
vaded New England, while an "agrarian species of republicanism," 
which advocated a more limited view of government and the so-
cially-created virtue of individual property holders, held sway in 
other parts, especially in tobacco-planting areas. 
Given the complex tangle of "principles and interests" that 
criss-crossed both the new nation and the Philadelphia Convention, 
McDonald dismisses reductionist notions about original intent. "It 
should be obvious," he argues, "that it is meaningless to say that the 
Framers intended this or that the Framers intended that: their po-
sitions were diverse and, in many particulars, incompatible. "s At 
times even they themselves might have wondered exactly what they 
intended. When discussing the commerce clause, "whose history is 
shrouded in mystery," for instance, McDonald notes that today's 
intention-seekers enjoy information, courtesy of modem scholar-
ship, about the workings of the Convention's committee of style, 
which the delegates themselves probably did not possess. 6 
More important for serious students of the second United 
States Constitution, McDonald sees the "republicanism" versus 
"liberalism" debate, so prominent in recent historical and constitu-
tional law scholarship, 1 as fatally simplistic. McDonald's multi-
layered arguments on this point defy easy summary. For example, 
Gordon Wood's now familiar thesis-that the fight over the Consti-
tution of 1787 demarcated the end of classical-republican and the 
beginnings of modem, interest-group constitutionalism-draws 
some of McDonald's ire. For McDonald, this A-gives-way-to-B 
formulation, however elegantly elaborated, forgets that sophisti-
GINS OF THE CoNSTITUTION 205-09 ( 1985). See also Banning, The Practicable Sphere of a 
Republic: James Madison, the Constitutional ConW!ntion, and the Emergence of Revolution-
ary Federalism, in BEYOND CoNFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CoNSTITUTION AND AMER-
ICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 162 (R. Beeman, S. Botein & E. Carter eds. 1987) [hereinafter 
BEYOND CoNFEDERATION] (emphasizing Madison's changing, but still central role); Hutson, 
Riddles of the Federal Constitutional ConW!ntion, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 411 (1987) (question-
ing Madison's influence and also the authenticity of his much-cited documentary record). 
5. F. McDoNALD, supra note 4, at 224. 
6. /d. at 271. 
7. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term: Foreword: Traces of Self-
GoW!rnment, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986). See also Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New 
Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 20 (1986); Banning, Jeffersonion Ideology Revisited: Liberal 
and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1986); Herzog, 
Some Questions for Republicans, 14 PoL. THEORY 473 (1986). 
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cated political leaders, especially George Washington, believed that 
the search for "fame" and the desire for a good reputation could 
preserve the old republican ideal of disinterested public service and 
perhaps even prevent the "baser passions of most men" from cor-
rupting politicallife.s 
A Federalist partisan himself, McDonald applauds the kind of 
political leader, epitomized by Washington and Hamilton, who tri-
umphed at Philadelphia. Standing, in effect, amongst conflicting in-
tellectual traditions and fierce political passions, this extraordinary 
group of hardheaded reformers "devised a new order out of materi-
als prescribed by the ages" and wisely drew "their Constitution 
loosely enough so that it might live and breath and change with 
time." 
How, then, should scholars evaluate the ideas behind and 
within the Constitution of 1787? Finding political-constitutional 
discourse itself undergoing rapid change, especially during the late 
1780s, McDonald charts the quick-moving twists and turns, espe-
cially over the term "republican," occurring in public debates. 
When opponents of the Constitution attacked it as anti-republican, 
for instance, the Hamiltons and Madisons deftly countered by rede-
fining "republicanism" in novel but convincing ways. Even though 
McDonald wants to underscore the ways in which the Constitution 
of 1787 retained traditional ideals, the people at Philadelphia, and 
those defending their efforts during the ratification struggles, ulti-
mately "devised a novus ordo seclorum" and "rendered all previous 
vocabulary obsolete as it pertained to the government of the United 
States." 
Too much constitutional scholarship, McDonald suggests, fails 
to appreciate the innovations of 1787. Montesquieuan ideals about 
separation of powers, for example, gave way to a novel system of 
checks and balances. In McDonald's view, the governmental 
structure envisioned in the Constitution contemplated a complex 
arrangement of governmental power, not simply between the cen-
tral and state levels but among local juries and militia groups. In 
this sense, moreover, the Philadelphia document did not really rest 
upon liberal, individualist contract theory. "Rather, it was a com-
pact among political societies; there was not a single republic, or 
even thirteen, but a multitude of them." With adoption of this new 
8. For an interpretation that differs, in part, from McDonald's on this point, see G. 
WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1984). 
Gordon Wood, meanwhile, also now warns that the question of republicanism or liberalism is 
"badly put" and "assumes a sharp dichotomy between two clearly identifiable traditions that 
eighteenth-century reality will not support." Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal 
America, 44 WM. & MAllY Q. 628, 634 (1987). 
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constitutional structure, the United States became "a nation com-
posed of several thousand insular communities, each of which exer-
cised virtually absolute powers over its members through the 
traditional institutions of the jury and the militia." Thus, the fram-
ers' Constitution "defied categorization by any existing nomencla-
ture .... " 
Likewise, McDonald's own book sometimes defies familiar his-
toriographical pigeonholes. A self-styled conservative, unlikely to 
attend a CLS summer camp, McDonald nonetheless relies upon 
Morton Horwitz's view of how the common law was reshaped in 
the service of capitalist interests.9 And though McDonald draws 
upon the work of such celebrated intellectual historians as Gordon 
Wood and J.G.A. Pocock, he dissents from their emphasis upon the 
powerful grip of ideological paradigms. In contrast to Wood's view, 
that there is "no behavior without ideology" and that "ideas give 
meaning to our action," McDonald's approach to the relationship 
between constitutional rhetoric and politics sometimes recalls the 
legal realists of the 1930s. McDonald's framers are "politically 
multilingual," able to speak in whatever set of ideological symbols 
"seemed rhetorically appropriate to the particular argument at 
hand." 
McDonald ignores much of the recent scholarshipw linking 
constitutionalism to "the new social history." He offers no discus-
sion, for example, on the "gendered meanings" of republicanism or 
the ways in which urban artisans tried to reshape the elitist republi-
can heritage to their own historical experience. To McDonald, 
backcountry areas were not, as some social historians have argued, 
misgoverned; they were essentially ungovernable. And though he 
has "read virtually every line of virtually every extant American 
newspaper" and "a large body of personal correspondence," Mc-
Donald generally credits the perspectives of the Federalist elite, es-
pecially when dealing, much too briefly, with the ratification 
debates. If Madison and Hamilton, for example, were trying to re-
construct the discourse between 1787 and 1789, what about all of 
the opponents of the Constitution? Here too, McDonald tends to 
reject (or ignore) some of the recent scholarship, especially that 
which praises the Anti-Federalists ofthe late 1780s, the people who 
9. See M. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); Horwitz, Re-
publicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
57 (1987). 
10. See, e.g., T. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION (1986) (favorable view of 
complaints of misgovernment by backcountry protestors); S. WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMo-
CRATIC 61-103 (1984) (sympathetic portrait of "artisan republicanism"); Bloch, The 
Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37 (1987). 
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(according to Gordon Wood) "really belonged to the future."ll 
Yet McDonald is too good a historian not to acknowledge 
what the nineteenth century had in store for the United States, espe-
cially when his own acute analysis of political economy suggests 
some of the ways in which legal-constitutional discourse intersected 
with the rise of a nationwide, capitalist economy. Indeed, McDon-
ald approaches the end of this book on a note of almost regretful 
nostalgia. The coming of "the Age of Liberalism, the Age of Capi-
talism and Democracy," a society of hyperindividualists, would 
have "neither room for nor need of the kind of virtuous public ser-
vants who so abundantly graced the public councils during the 
Founding Era." The "race of pygmies [who] came to infest the 
public councils" of later eras might even have destroyed the consti-
tutional temple itself. 
According to McDonald, though, the day of the locust never 
quite arrived, and he closes with appropriately fileopietistic, upbeat 
crescendos. He finds comfort in the earthly pull of cultural gravity, 
his firm conviction that a deeply-rooted "cultural conservatism" has 
helped to preserve the essential logic of the Constitution.12 The 
wise men of Philadelphia, along with those almost as learned "Opti-
mates" who immediately followed them, framed and then protected 
a constitutional order that became "firmly established and self-
maintaining .... " After 200 years, "constitutional government had 
become part of the second nature of homo politicus Americanus."B 
McDonald ends with the Bismarckian line about a "special Provi-
dence" taking care of fools, drunks, and the United States. 
"Surely," he concludes, "the Founders believed the last of these." 
People less committed to this triad-Hamiltonian Federalism, 
cultural conservatism, and divine Providence-will likely look be-
yond this book's vistas in order to explain even the "intellectual 
origins" of the Constitution.l4 But Forrest McDonald's well-
11. See, e.g., Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in 
BEYOND CoNFEDERATION, supra note 4, at 109. And on the importance of the ratification 
debates across a spectrum of views even wider than McDonald surveys, see Kramnick, The 
"Great National Discussion·~· The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. &. MARY Q. 3 (1988). 
12. According to McDonald, the "principle of cultural conservatism, which describes a 
far greater stabilizing force than government is familiar to anthropologists; but historians 
commonly overlook it, concentrating upon politics and government." F. McDoNALD, supra 
note 4, at 161 n.34. 
13. For an essay criticizing the view that the new constitution actually encouraged the 
Optimates, men of unique talent and vision to enter and remain in public office, something 
that was a clear goal of many Federalists of 1787, see Rakove, The Structure of Politics at the 
Accession of George Washington, in BEYOND CoNFEDERATION, supra note 4, at 261. And for 
continual laments that people of talent have too often been absent from our public life, seeN. 
ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN 71-129 (1986). 
14. See, e.g., The Constitution and American Life: A Special Issue, 74 J. AM. HtST. 661 
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crafted book both nicely completes a distinguished author's per-
sonal cycle and insightfully raises new questions for historical and 
constitutional debates. 
THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Archibald 
Cox.t Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1987. Pp. 434. $19.95. 
David P. Bryden 2 
Professor Archibald Cox's latest book is a popular history of 
constitutional law, from "Miracle at Philadelphia" to the Rehnquist 
Court. Part One ("Building a Nation") includes chapters on "Judi-
cial Supremacy," "Federal Power and Supremacy," "Opening a 
National Market," and "One Nation Indivisib!e." Part Two 
("From Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State") contains four chapters 
that bring the reader from the Civil War to "The Warren Court," 
which is the title of the introductory chapter in the third and final 
historical section of the book, covering "The Nonconformists" (reli-
gion), "National Security and the First Amendment," "Protection 
for the Accused," "School Desegregation," "Affirmative Action," 
"Political Equality," "Invidious Distinctions and Fundamental 
Rights," and "Abortion." In the last chapter, Professor Cox muses 
about "The Future of Judicial Review." 
Although it does not purport to be very original, The Court 
and the Constitution is a useful addition to the overcrowded shelves 
of constitutional literature. It's much better written than most his-
tory books and would make excellent supplemental reading for law 
students, not only to supply historical perspective but also to pro-
vide a coherent point of view about the great cases and problems, an 
antidote to the confusion of class discussions and a foil-if that's 
not too condescending a word-for any contrasting ideas the pro-
fessor has to offer. 
As history, Cox's work can best be judged by historians. Of 
course, it isn't just history. Cox brings to his task a law professor's 
characteristic concerns, and the book is a series of didactic essays 
(1987); see esp. Appleby, The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HIST. 798 (1987), an essay 
that essentially stands McDonald on his head. See alsc Nash, Alsc There at the Creation: 
Going Beyond Gordon S. Wood, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 602 (1987). 
I. Carl M. Loeb University Professor Emeritus, Harvard University; Visiting Profes-
sor of Law, Boston University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
